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Note
FRYE V. FRYE: MARYLAND SACRIFICES THE CHILD FOR
THE SAKE OF THE FAMILY
I. THE CASE
In Frye v. Frye' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that pa-
rental immunity prohibits a child from suing a parent in tort negli-
gence.' By so holding, the court reaffirmed the rule of parental
immunity for unintentional torts despite its recent decision permit-
ting one spouse to sue the other in negligence.' The court
grounded its holding on the differences between parental and inter-
spousal immunities and on policy considerations.4
George L. Frye, III, infant son of Barbara and George L. Frye,
Jr., was injured in an automobile accident caused by his father's neg-
ligent driving.' His mother Mrs. Frye, who was also injured, sued
the child's father (her husband) for damages both on her own behalf
and as George III's next friend.6 The trial court dismissed the action
as to Mrs. Frye because of interspousal immunity,7 and as to George
III because of parental immunity.' Mrs. Frye subsequently appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals, but asked the Court of Appeals to
certify the case.9 The Court of Appeals granted her petition.' °
Between the time of the accident and the appeal, the Court of
Appeals completely abrogated interspousal immunity in Boblitz v.
Boblitz," reasoning that changes in the spousal relationship abol-
1. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
2. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
3. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
4. 305 Md. at 557-58, 567, 505 A.2d at 834, 839. The court declined to abrogate
the immunity in part for automobile accidents. Such action, it stated, should come from
the General Assembly, not the judiciary. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
5. Id. at 554, 505 A.2d at 827.
6. Id. Because a minor child is usually incapable of undertaking a suit alone, a
guardian is appointed to appear on the child's behalf. Generally, this function is per-
formed by a parent. See Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930);
2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW oF TORTS § 8.11 (2d ed. 1986).
7. 305 Md. at 544, 505 A.2d at 827.
8. Id. Mrs. Frye also sued George Jr.'s insurer for breach of contract on George
Jr.'s uninsured motorist policy. This action was dismissed and is an insignificant issue in
the court's reasoning. Id. at 567-68, 505 A.2d at 839-40.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
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ished the common law rationale for the rule. 12 Mrs. Frye was unable
to use Boblitz to her advantage since the court had specified that Bob-
litz was to be applied prospectively.'" Nevertheless, she based her
appeal on George III's behalf on the Boblitz reasoning.' 4 Mrs. Frye
argued that the analogy between interspousal and parental immu-
nity required that if the former were abrogated, the latter must be
also. 15
After considering the common law history of both interspousal
and parental immunities, the court rejected Mrs. Frye's argument,
holding that the two immunities are based on separate grounds and
have distinct legal histories;' 6 the abrogation of one, therefore, does
not necessitate abrogation of the other.' 7 With regard to parental
immunity, the court stressed the policies of fostering family har-
mony and supporting parental authority.' 8 Interspousal immunity,
on the other hand, rests on the common law idea of the unity of
husband and wife whereby the wife was legally merged into her hus-
band.' 9 While each type of immunity in fact rests on additional
grounds, by thus reducing the bases for the immunities to their es-
sence, the court stressed the distinctions between the two immuni-
ties rather than their similarities. 20 In addition, the court asserted
that even if parental immunity should be abrogated, the action
should come from the legislature, not the judiciary, since matters of
statutory public policy are at issue.2 ' In Maryland, the common law
emphasis on the unity of the family has been codified. 22 Further-
more, the existence of compulsory automobile insurance is man-
dated by statute; therefore, the legislature should make any changes
in policies affecting the insurance program.23 Based on this reason-
12. See id. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
13. Id. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
14. See 305 Md. at 544, 505 A.2d at 827.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834.
17. Id. at 557, 505 A.2d at 834.
18. Id. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836.
19. Id. at 553, 505 A.2d at 832.
20. See infra notes 37 and 69 and accompanying text.
21. 305 Md. at 566-67, 505 A.2d at 839.
22. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1984). The statute reads in part: "The Gen-
eral Assembly declares: (1) that it is the policy of this State to promote family stability,
to preserve family unity, and to help families achieve and maintain self-reliance." Id.
This is not a naked declaration of policy. Rather, it serves as the preface to the subtitle
that sets forth the duties of the Department of Human Resources to families with
children.
23. 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539, 541 (1979
& Supp. 1985).
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ing, the court affirmed the dismissal.24
II. BACKGROUND LAW
A. Parental Immunity
There is no indication that parental immunity existed at English
common law.25 A child was considered separate from the parents,
with individual legal rights and responsibilities,26 and thus could be
held liable for torts, could own property, and could enter into con-
tracts."7 A child was free to sue a parent concerning property rights,
but no English cases clearly state that a minor could sue a parent for
personal torts.28 Early American common law was also unclear as to
the existence of parental immunity, with some commentators assert-
ing that a child could sue a parent and others claiming that immu-
nity existed.29
In 1891, however, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held in the
case of Hewlett v. George3" that a minor child could not sue a par-
ent.3 In Hewlett, a daughter alleged that her mother had impris-
oned her in a mental asylum in order to gain control of the girl's
property.3 2 Citing no authority, the court held that the daughter
24. 305 Md. at 568, 505 A.2d at 840.
25. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 A. 905, 907 (1930). It is important to
remember that the general rule in tort is liability for unreasonable acts causing harm.
Any immunity is an exception to the rule and exists because the justification for the
immunity is supreme. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 288, 293 (1971);see Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 260, 462 A.2d 506, 514 (1983)
(quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976)).
26. See 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11; see also Waltzinger v.
Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1956) ("[T]he common law conception
of unity of legal identity of husband and wife had no similar conception of unity of legal
identity in the case of parent and minor child").
27. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11. Although many of a
minor's contracts were voidable at the minor's option, the minor did have the power to
enter into a contract. Id.
28. See id. The Court of Appeals has stated that "there is nothing in the English
decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal
tort." Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64-65, 77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951).
29. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 357-58, 150 A. 905, 907-08 (1930); Mahnke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64-65, 77 A.2d 923, 924-25 (1951).
30. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
31. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
32. Id. at 704. (Editor's note: The regional reporter does not contain the court's
statement of facts in which this proposition appears.) The minor daughter had been
married but was separated from her husband. The court treated her as still under pa-
rental control, while at the same time pointing out that her marriage might have dis-
solved the bonds of parental authority so that she could maintain the suit. Id. at 711, 9
So. at 887.
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could not maintain the suit; permitting the suit would disrupt the
peace and harmony of the home. 3  Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that the criminal laws would afford the daughter a means of
redress.
Despite the lack of authority for the holding in Hewlett, other
courts quickly adopted parental immunity as the common law rule.
3 5
Courts fo~lowing Hewlett stressed the policy of supporting family
unity and harmony.3 6 Furthermore, the courts emphasized the need
for parental authority and discretion in rearing children, reasoning
that if parent-child suits were permitted, parents would face limit-
less liability.37
33. The court held:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of
society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id.
34. Id. Thus relying on Hewlett, the Supreme Court of Washington extended the
immunity to a man convicted of raping his minor daughter. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 244, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (1905); see also McKelvey v. McKelvey, 11 Tenn. 388, 390-
91, 77 S.W. 664, 664 (1905) (immunity extended to parent who allegedly committed
cruel and inhuman assault upon a child). This view has met with harsh criticism:
To deny a recovery in damages to a daughter against a father who has been
convicted of raping her on the ground that it would tend to disturb the beauty,
tranquillity, and sanctity of that home is nothing short of absurdity. To deny it
in a case in which the peacefulness of the home has been so rudely broken
because of the tranquillity in some other homes or because of the abstract
peace in the abstract home seems hardly consistent with sound policy. To deny
the action in the interest of domestic discipline is equally untenable as the fa-
ther was hardly acting in his capacity of parent in committing the assault.
2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11 (footnote omitted).
35. See 305 Md. at 545, 505 A.2d at 828.
36. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 917, 479 P.2d 648, 649-50, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 289 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment c (1979) (criticiz-
ing the rationale).
37. Cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909-10 (1930); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comments c, k (1979). Courts have offered a number
of other arguments in defense of the immunity: the risk of fraud and collusion among
family members; the threat to family finances; the distinction between personal torts and
torts against property; the line between commonplace accidents in the home and negli-
gent acts for which liability is imposed; and, finally, the possibility that the parent would
become the child's heir and successor to any damages recovered. Id.
In the comments to the RESTATEMENT, Prosser set forth what is probably the defini-
tive critique of these justifications for the immunity:
As in the case of husband and wife, the chief reason usually advanced today for
the immunity is that domestic peace and parental discipline and control would
be disturbed by permitting an action for a personal tort. Again the theory ap-
parently has been that an uncompensated tort makes for family peace and har-
mony, and that there is somehow a distinction in this respect between personal
torts and those affecting only property. Another reason sometimes given is
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Maryland followed the trend of other courts in recognizing and
extending the doctrine of parental immunity. In Schneider v. Schnei-
der 38 the court held that a parent could not sue a minor child.39 The
court stressed the paradoxical dual role of parent as adversary which
would exist if the suit were permitted, since the child would rely on
the parent to hire the child's attorney and pay the cost of litiga-
tion. In Yost v. Yost 4 the Maryland court held that a child could
that to allow one child to recover from a parent would deplete the family funds
in his favor at the expense of other children. Neither of these reasons would
appear to outweigh the more urgent desirability of compensating the injured
person, and particularly a child, for genuine harm that may cripple him for life
and ruin his entire future. The development of liability insurance, especially in
the area of automobile accidents, has removed to a considerable extent
whatever theoretical justification this reasoning may once have afforded. In
turn the insurance has given rise to an additional argument, that of the danger
of collusion against liability insurance companies-which again would appear
not to be beyond the power of the courts to deal with and in any case not to
outweigh the desirability of compensating the injured person.
Id. at comment c. For further criticism of these rationales for the immunity, see Gibson
v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
38. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
39. Id. at 23-24, 152 A. at 500.
40. The court stated:
The ordinary position of parent and guardian of a minor, and that of plaintiff
seeking to recover from the minor, are positions which cannot both be occu-
pied by one person at one and the same time. Maintenance of the suit is incon-
sistent with the parent's status or office, and the dependence of the minor upon
her, and also with the dependence of the law upon her for the fulfillment of
necessary legal and social functions.
Id. at 21-22, 150 A. at 499. Furthermore:
A minor is even more dependent upon a parent to provide for him the judg-
ment and care which he, and any property of his, may need during his immatur-
ity. In a suit against him he would ordinarily depend upon his parents to
procure him an attorney, for he cannot appoint one .... There would be a
question whether the parent would not be obliged to pay the expenses of litiga-
tion of the child.
Id. at 23, 150 A. at 500 (citations omitted).
More recently, courts have come to see the fallacy of this argument. Recognizing
that the child's adversary is not in fact the parent, but rather the parent's insurance
carrier, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts wrote:
When insurance is involved, the action between parent and child is not truly
adversary; both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create a
fund for the child's medical care and support without depleting the family's
other assets. Far from being a potential source of disharmony, the action is
more likely to preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal - the eas-
ing of family financial difficulties stemming from the child's injuries.
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 363, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975); see also Streenz
v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970).
The Sorensen court stated elsewhere:
When an action is brought against a parent, frequently it will be brought at the
[VOL. 46:194
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not sue a parent in equity for non-support.42 The court explained
that the voluntary payment of support was a moral duty, not a legal
one, since the child had no legal right to demand that the parent
spend a given amount on support.43
While at first courts eagerly embraced the Hewlett rule, excep-
tions to the immunity quickly began to appear. In each situation,
the rationale for the exception was that permitting immunity would
not promote the aim of family harmony.44 Thus, the immunity did
not apply in the case of an emancipated child, since the child was
beyond the reach of parental authority.45 Likewise, if an employer-
employee relationship existed between parent and child,4 6 or if the
injury occurred in the course of the parent's business, 4 7 some courts
argued that harmony was not at stake.
The Maryland case of Mahnke v. Moore48 established a signifi-
cant exception to the parental immunity rule. In Mahnke, a father
forced his young daughter 49 to witness his murder of her mother
instance of, or with the approval of, the parent with an eye toward recovery
from the parent's already purchased liability insurance. When there is no in-
surance coverage it is unlikely that suit will be brought against the parent.
369 Mass. at 361, 339 N.E.2d at 913.
41. 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937).
42. Id. at 134, 190 A. at 756. Under the terms of a divorce settlement, the father's
legal duty to support his child financially ended when the child reached the age of three.
Id. at 131, 190 A. at 754.
43. See id. at 133-34, 190 A. at 755-56.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comments d - i (1979); 2 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11.
45. See, e.g., Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1956). The
court also mentioned that the son's lack of ill will towards his mother for bringing suit
provided additional justification for allowing the suit. Id.
46. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (parent employed son
at regular wage, and insurer providing liability insurance was aware of son's employ-
ment). Compare Sherby v. Weather Bros. Transfer Co., 421 F.2d 1243, 1246 (4th Cir.
1970) (federal court, purporting to apply Maryland law, held that parent-child immunity
barred child's recovery from father's employer).
47. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 28, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939) (child injured while
a passenger on her father's bus was allowed to recover). Two additional exceptions
should be noted. First, the common law right of the child to sue the parent for torts
against property has been maintained. Second, there is no immunity if the liability is not
based directly on the parent-child relationship. Thus, one standing merely in loco parentis
does not enjoy the immunity. Furthermore, a third person vicariously or jointly liable
for the parent's tort may not escape liability for the child's injury merely because the
child's parent is also a tortfeasor. Finally, if the parent-child relationship has been ter-
minated by death, the suit may be permitted since the relationship no longer exists.
Thus, a child's estate may sue the parent in a wrongful death action. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 895G comments d - i (1979).
48. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
49. The child was illegitimate, but the court indicated that under these circumstances
1986]
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and his subsequent suicide.5 ° The court held that parental immu-
nity did not apply to intentional torts such as this because the father
had abandoned his parental authority and destroyed the domestic
tranquillity that the immunity seeks to preserve.5 1
As a result of the erosion of the immunity by the numerous ex-
ceptions, some courts sought to abrogate the still-remaining immu-
nity in whole or in part. A number of courts abolished the immunity
for automobile accidents, citing the widespread use of liability insur-
ance as a protection against disruption of family harmony.52 Other
courts went further, abrogating parental immunity virtually com-
pletely, and allowing flexibility for parental discipline and everyday
family activities. In Goller v. White 51 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that no immunity existed except in situations involving an exer-
cise of parental authority or discretion.54 The California Supreme
Court went one step further in Gibson v. Gibson55 when it rejected the
Goller formulation and held that the standard should be that of a
"reasonable and prudent parent."56 Despite these moves by other
courts to abrogate parental immunity in negligence, Maryland has
not done the same.57 Thus, the state of the law prior to Frye was
her legitimacy was not an issue in determining the liability of her father. Id. at 69, 77
A.2d at 926.
50. Id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924. The father blew the mother's brains out with a shot-
gun, kept the child with the corpse for a week, and then killed himself with a shotgun,
spraying the child with his blood. Not surprisingly, the daughter suffered "shock,
mental anguish and permanent nervous and physical injuries." Id.
51. Id. at 67-68, 77 A.2d at 926. The court stated:
[T]here can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit against her
father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the simple reason that
there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to be preserved
.... [W]hen, as in this case, the parent is guilty of acts which show complete
abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit
by the child, on the ground that discipline should be maintained in the home,
cannot logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his
parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit.
Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975).
53. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
54. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. The RESTATEMENT cites Goller with approval.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G commentj (1979).
55. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
56. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. The court wrote: "The stan-
dard to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of the
parental role. Thus, we think the proper test of a parent's conduct is this: what would
an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" Id.
This same view is espoused in 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11.
57. On three occasions between Waltzinger in 1957 and Frye in 1986, the Court of
Special Appeals declined to modify the contours of the rule. See Shell Oil Co. v. Ryck-
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that while no immunity existed for intentional torts under Mahnke,
immunity for negligence was still the rule according to Schneider.
B. Interspousal Immunity
The origins of interspousal immunity are much older than
those of parental immunity. At English common law, husband and
wife were considered "one flesh." 58 The practical effect of this
metaphysical theory was that the wife was considered legally
"merged" into her husband so that she could not bring suit against
anyone for any reason unless her husband was joined as a party. 59
As a result, a wife was unable to sue her husband since to allow her
to do so would in a sense mean that he would be suing himself.6"
Within the last century this doctrine has come under serious
attack as a result of the changing role of women in society. During
the late 1800's, most states passed some version of the Married Wo-
men's Acts giving the wife a right to sue in her own name.6 1 While
on the surface the wording of the acts abrogated interspousal immu-
nity," an early federal case held that the intent was only to allow a
woman to sue a third party without joining her husband; the intent
was not to give her a cause of action against her husband.63
Despite this narrow interpretation of the statutes, other courts
man, 43 Md. App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979); Sanford v. Sanford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290
A.2d 812 (1972); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971).
58. Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 192, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1971) (citing
Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 176-77, 96 S.E. 315, 321-22 (1918)
(Burks, J. concurring)).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F comment b (1979).
60. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 553, 505 A.2d 826, 832 (1986).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F comment c.
62. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-204 (1984). For a detailed history of the
Married Women's Act in Maryland, see Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77, 79-
82 (1978).
63. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). The Supreme Court construed
the District of Columbia statute in question very narrowly, explaining that a broader
interpretation permitting suits between husband and wife might jeopardize the harmony
of the home and of society. The Court reasoned that had the legislature intended to
permit a wife to sue her husband, it could have done so explicitly in the statute. Id. at
618-19.
The statute provided in part: " 'Married women shall have the power... to sue
separately for the recovery, security, or protection of their property, and for torts com-
mitted against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.' " Id. at 616. Com-
mentators have pointed out that the language of the statute did, in fact, seem inclusive
enough to permit suits by a woman against her husband. Nevertheless, many courts
interpreted similar statutes as the Supreme Court did, thus adopting the threat to do-
mestic harmony as a new rationale for maintaining interspousal immunity. 2 F. HARPER,
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.10.
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began to dismantle interspousal immunity.64 In Maryland, the
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment into the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights65 signalled the beginning of the end of interspousal
immunity. In Lusby v. Luwby, 66 after tracing the history of the immu-
nity and the Married Women's Acts, the court held that no inter-
spousal immunity existed for intentional torts, since, as in Mahnke,
there was no domestic harmony left to disrupt.6 7 The final blow to
interspousal immunity came in Boblitz, the case on which Mrs. Frye
based her appeal on George III's behalf. The court in Boblitz com-
pletely abrogated interspousal immunity, so that the wife in Boblitz
was able to sue her husband in negligence for an automobile acci-
dent.6' After explaining the history of the immunity, the court con-
sidered the effect such suits might have on the harmony of the
home,69 and held that the immunity was an anachronism that should
be abolished.70
64. One of the first steps was to construe the Married Women's Acts as permitting a
woman to sue her husband concerning her property interests even though the immunity
still protected him from suit in personal torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F
comment c (1979). See 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.10 n. 17 and
authorities cited therein.
65. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of
sex." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. 46 (1972).
66. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
67. Id. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88. The husband forced his wife's car off the road, held
her at gunpoint, and forced her to submit to rape by two other men, threatening to kill
her if she told what had happened. Id. at 335-36, 390 A.2d at 77.
68. 296 Md. 242, 275,462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983). Until Frye the court had focused on
the similarities between interspousal and parental immunities. Thus, Lusby used the ab-
olition of immunity for intentional parental torts in Mahnke as a basis for abrogating im-
munity for intentional interspousal torts. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 351, 390 A.2d 77,
85 (1978). Had the court continued this pattern by comparing Boblitz' abrogation of
interspousal immunity in negligence with the question of parental immunity in Frye, the
result in Frye should have been different.
69. The court also dispensed with several other arguments in favor of interspousal
immunity: the risk of fraud and collusion between husband and wife; the danger of an
increase in trivial claims; the adequacy of the redress afforded by divorce and criminal
courts; and the need for legislative action to abrogate immunity. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296
Md. 242, 256-57, 462 A.2d 506, 513 (1983). After analyzing these arguments as applied
by the courts of other states, the Boblitz court concluded: "We are persuaded that the
reasons asserted for [the immunity's] retention do not survive careful scrutiny." Id. at
273, 462 A.2d at 521. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F comment d
(1979) (listing the arguments offered in support of the immunity and concluding that
they are "poor justification for denying all remedy for a serious and genuine wrong").
For a comparison with the rationales given in support of parental immunity, see supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
70. 296 Md. 242, 273, 462 A.2d 506, 521.
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III. ANALYSIS
In Frye v. Frye7 1 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that paren-
tal immunity is still the law in negligence cases.72 A careful analysis
of the court's reasoning reveals that the court interpreted the bases
for the parental and interspousal immunities very narrowly, con-
trasting rather than comparing the two immunities. A broader view
should have resulted in at least partial abrogation of parental
immunity.
In tracing the history of parental immunity, the court stressed
the "common theme" of "the relation in which the parent and the
unemancipated minor child stand to each other" and "[t]he recipro-
cal dependence and entitlement of that relationship. ' T The court
emphasized "its belief in the importance of keeping the family rela-
tionship free and unfettered," asserting that the "primary concern
... was the protection of family integrity and harmony and the pro-
tection of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the
child."' 74 Support of family unity and parental authority is also a
matter of statutory law in Maryland. The General Assembly has
codified the common law duties of the parent to support the child
and the common law rights of the parent to the services and earn-
ings of the child.75 Because tranquillity of the family is both a mat-
ter of common law and statutory public policy, the court
emphasized that nothing should be done to jeopardize the stability
of the home.76 According to the court, parental immunity has
served an important function by helping to preserve that har-
mony.77 Despite the asserted importance of family unity, the court
was willing to reevaluate the status of the parent-child relationship
71. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
72. See id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
73. Id. at 548, 505 A.2d at 829.
74. Id. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831.
75. Id. at 559, 505 A.2d at 835; MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984).
76. 305 Md. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831. The court declared:
The parental status should be held inviolate so that there be no undue interfer-
ence with the dependence of the minor unemancipated child on the parents for
such judgment and care needed during the child's minority or with the depen-
dence of the law on the parent for fulfillment of the necessary legal and social
functions associated with the office of parent. This court has declared it to be
the public policy that discipline in the family not be impaired and that tranquil-
ity of the home be preserved. Matters which tend to disrupt or destroy the
peace and harmony of family or home are not to be condoned.
Id. at 551-52, 505 A.2d at 831.
77. Id. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831.
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in light of Boblitz and the abrogation of interspousal immunity. 78
In assessing the logic used in Boblitz to abrogate interspousal
immunity, the court dwelt heavily on the changed status of
women. 79 By the time Boblitz was decided, a majority of states had
already abrogated interspousal immunity, many doing so by judicial
decision.80 Because the legal unity of husband and wife no longer
was recognized, the rationale for interspousal immunity has been
substantially weakened.8' However, the court reasoned that since
parent and child have always been separate entities in the eyes of the
law, no such change has occurred in the parent-child relationship,
and the rationale for the parental immunity remains valid.82
So far as it goes, the logic of the court in Frye is valid. However,
whereas the court in Boblitz listed several arguments supporting in-
terspousal immunity,83 the court in Frye relied only on those relating
to the common law unity of husband and wife. 84 Boblitz stressed that
as the idea of unity lost favor, other rationales, which the Frye court
did not address, had been offered in support of interspousal immu-
nity, including the risk of harm to family harmony.85 In dispensing
with this argument, Boblitz cited cases which stated that not allowing
the suit could cause more disruption than permitting it, 86 and that
suits involving property, which were permitted between spouses,8 7
posed no less risk to harmony than suits for personal torts. 88
Indeed, these are the arguments courts and critics often ad-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 553-58, 505 A.2d at 832-84. For a discussion of the history of the status of
women, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 555-56, 505 A.2d at 833.
81. See id. at 556-57, 505 A.2d at 833-34.
82. Id. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834.
83. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
84. 305 Md. at 556-57, 505 A.2d at 833-34. According to the Frye court, the "princi-
pal considerations leading to the decision in Boblitz" concerned the changed status of
women: the rejected concept of unity, the passage of the Married Women's Acts, and
the great number of cases criticizing immunity. Id. While these considerations were of
great importance in Boblitz, they were not the only hurdles that the Boblitz court suc-
ceeded in overcoming. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85. On numerous occasions in Boblitz alone the Court of Appeals recognized family
harmony as ajustification for interspousal immunity. See 296 Md. at 252-71, 462 A.2d at
510-20. In earlier cases as well, the court criticized the family harmony argument. See,
e.g., Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978); Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md.
662, 666-67, 87 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1952).
86. 296 Md. 242, 266, 462 A.2d 506, 517-18, (citing Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 NJ.
535, 551, 388 A.2d 951, 959 (1978)).
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 264, 462 A.2d 506, 516-17 (1983) (citing Brown
v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953)).
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vance in support of abrogating or limiting parental immunity.8 9 If
the threat to family harmony is not a serious concern in interspousal
immunity, it should not be so in parental immunity. The policy pro-
moting family harmony clearly protects the spousal relationship as
well as the parental one, since the spousal relationship is the bed-
rock of family unity.9 ° Therefore, the main argument used by the
court to defend parental immunity and to distinguish it from inter-
spousal immunity evaporates when viewed in light of Boblitz.
A further weakness in the court's logic in Frye is its reluctance to
distinguish between actions that arise out Of the parental relation-
ship and those that do not. The court stressed that public policy
demands that the parent's authority be upheld in discharging the
parental duty.9 ' Certainly, the parent needs to be able to exercise
authority and judgment in deciding how to rear a child, provide for
support, and conduct a household. However, outside of the home,
a parent may engage in many activities that affect a child but that do
not arise from the parental relationship. As explained above, some
courts have held that if a parent employs a child, or if a child is
injured in the course of the parent's business, the child may sue,
since the activity causing the harm does not arise out of the parental
function.92 The same logic has been applied in automobile accident
cases, since the duty to use reasonable care in driving extends to the
general public and not to the child alone.9" Even if the threat to
parental authority is a valid reason for maintaining parental immu-
nity, it should not be extended beyond its logical bounds.9 4 There-
fore, the more logical approach is to follow the general rule of
89. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 122, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977); Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1971); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895G comment d (1979).
90. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-402(b)(2)(i) (1984) (providing for state-
supported marital counseling).
91. 305 Md. at 551-52, 505 A.2d at 831. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
93. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365-66, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment k (1979).
94. In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930), the court
declared:
On its face, the rule is a harsh one. It denies protection to the weak upon the
ground that in this relation the administration ofjustice has been committed to
the strong, and that authority must be maintained. It should not be tolerated at
all except for very strong reasons; and it should never be extended beyond the
bounds compelled by those reasons.
This statement forms part of the basis for the holding in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,
67, 77 A.2d 923, 925 (1951), and is cited with approval in Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. at 547,
505 A.2d at 828.
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liability for unreasonable acts, but allow for parental discretion and
authority in discharging purely parental functions.95
In considering the status of parental immunity today, the court
surveyed the law of other states. Although only nine states other
than Maryland now retain complete parental immunity in negli-
gence,96 the court noted that of those states partially abrogating the
immunity, at least twenty have done so specifically in auto tort
cases.9 7 In addition to asserting that driving is outside the realm of
parental authority, courts have used the availability of automobile
liability insurance as a basis for this partial abrogation.98 The court
in Frye stressed the issue of insurance, arguing that the existence of
insurance should not determine liability.99 Furthermore, the court
noted that since automobile liability insurance is mandated by Mary-
land statute, to abrogate the immunity could alter the scope of in-
surance beyond the legislative intent by permitting recovery where
none was allowed before.' 00 Thus, the court stated that the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary, should address the question of parental
immunity.' 0 '
There are two weaknesses in the court's reasoning. First, the
court argued as if its only options were to abrogate the immunity for
automobile cases, or not to abrogate at all. 0 2 Since the court re-
jected insurance as a sufficient rationale for partially abrogating the
immunity, the only option the court left for itself was to retain com-
95. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
96. 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836. The nine other states are Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Louisiana
has codified the immunity, while Alabama, Nebraska, and Tennessee require that any
change come from the legislature. Arkansas stresses the family harmony rationale, while
Georgia and Indiana emphasize parental authority and control. Mississippi still follows
the Hewlett rule. Missouri, however, determines the immunity on a case-by-case basis. If
an evidentiary hearing determines that a suit will not threaten family harmony, then the
suit is permitted. Id. at 568-70, 505 A.2d at 840 (appendix to opinion).
97. Id. at 562, 505 A.2d at 836-37.
98. Id. at 562-63, 505 A.2d at 837. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350,
362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1068-70 (Fla. 1982)
(immunity waived to extent of insurance coverage).
99. See 305 Md. at 564, 505 A.2d at 838. In taking this position, the court held stead-
fastly to the view announced in Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930),
which was decided before the advent of compulsory liability insurance. Compare Soren-
sen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362-63, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975) (widespread availa-
bility of compulsory automobile liability insurance an important factor in decision to
partially abrogate immunity for motor torts).
100. 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539, 541 (1979
& Supp. 1985).
101. 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838.
102. Id. at 562-67, 505 A.2d at 836-39.
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plete immunity. However, while many courts have specifically ex-
cluded automobile torts, the court was certainly able to go further
and abrogate the immunity with respect to all activities falling
outside the parent-child relationship.10
The second flaw concerns the court's approach to insurance.
The court correctly noted that the existence of insurance should not
create liability where none existed before. ' 0 4 However, parental im-
munity is itself an exception to the general rule of tort liability and
exists because the importance of maintaining the stability of the
home outweighs the considerations behind the general rule.' °5 If,
for whatever reason, there is no threat to parental authority or fam-
ily harmony, then the immunity is not necessary.10 6 In this situa-
tion, insurance does not create liability; instead, it removes an
artificial barrier to liability by removing the reasons for the
immunity. 10
7
In addition, the court stressed that the legislature, not the judi-
ciary, should act regarding parental immunity, since the existence of
liability insurance is a matter of public policy and any alteration of
the immunity would interfere with that policy.' 0 8 However, while
the purpose of insurance is to afford a means of redress for injuries,
parental immunity strips the injured child of the only effective rem-
edy.'09 Thus, retaining parental immunity does not promote legis-
lative intent but rather thwarts it. Furthermore, while mandatory
insurance is indeed "exclusively a creature of the legislature," ' 10
and therefore should be addressed by that body, parental immunity
arose through judicial decision and could clearly be abrogated in
the same way, as was interspousal immunity in Boblitz."' Finally,
since the Maryland insurance statutes were in effect at the time of
the automobile accident in Boblitz," 2 abrogation of interspousal im-
munity had the same potential for affecting the legislatively pre-
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. See 305 Md. at 564, 505 A.2d at 838.
105. See supra note 25.
106. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 367, 150 A. 905, 912 (1930); 2 F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11.
107. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11.
108. 305 Md. at 566-67, 505 A.2d at 838-39.
109. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
110. 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
111. Id. at 566, 505 A.2d at 839.
112. Maryland's compulsory insurance statute took effect on January 1, 1973, while
the uninsured motorist coverage became law on July 1, 1975. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 539, 541 (1979 & Supp. 1985). The accident in Boblitz occurred on August 26, 1978.
Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 243, 462 A.2d 506, 506 (1982).
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scribed insurance scheme as the possibility of the abrogation of
parental immunity did in Frye. Since the existence of mandatory lia-
bility insurance did not prevent the court from abrogating inter-
spousal immunity, the argument should not have been used to
justify retention of parental immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the court's analysis of the basis for parental immunity
was correct, its comparison of parental and interspousal immunities
is one-sided, stressing only the differences but not the similarities
between the two doctrines. Furthermore, the court abdicated its au-
thority to act on a matter of judicial creation by insisting that the
legislature act regarding the subsidiary issue of insurance."13 By
thus retaining parental immunity in negligence, the court has hesi-
tated to take the final step in abrogating familial exceptions to the
general rule of liability for unreasonable actions," 4 and has failed to
follow the guidance of leading authorities which suggest that these
immunities should be abrogated." 5 Thus, the court has chosen to
hover timidly in the shadows of the past rather than step confidently
into the light of the future.
KATHRYN WEBB LOVILL
113. The court recognized that it had the authority to act. 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at
839. See also Harrison v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d
894, 903 (1983) ("[T]he common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its
ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions
to pressing societal problems").
114. The court has gone three-fourths of the way already. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md.
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951), abrogated parental immunity for intentional torts. Lusby v.
Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978), and Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 292, 462 A.2d
506 (1983), abolished interspousal immunity for intentional torts and negligence, re-
spectively. The only familial immunity left is the parental immunity for negligence
which the court here opted to retain. 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
115. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (1979) ("A parent or child
is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship."); 2
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 6, § 8.11 ("[lit seems likely that the trend
toward abrogation of the parent-child immunity will continue, and that such abrogation
will become the dominant doctrine in the United States.").
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